The Army’s flagship modernization program is the Future Combat System (FCS).

The FCS concept is designed to be part of the Army’s future force, a transformed Army that’s faster, more deployable and more responsive. This differs substantially from the large division-centric structure of the past. In short, the FCS concept is to replace mass with superior information — allowing soldiers to see and hit the enemy first, rather than to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit.

Although Congress has reduced funding for the FCS program in past years for valid reasons, I believe the program progressed to a point where Congress should fully fund the program per the President’s 2009 budget request. At the same time, the Army needs to spend less time trying to save the FCS program; and more time explaining how soldiers want and need the capabilities that FCS brings to the fight.

To be clear, the view from Congress is simple when it comes to defense acquisition programs. We are in a fiscal death spiral. Time and time again we end up paying more for weapon systems to get less than what was promised. Congress’s role is to consider the overall yearly and long-term budgets for the Department of Defense (DoD).

Given current fiscal constraints, the challenges of fully funding the Global War on Terror, and the costs to reconstitute our current forces, the question we have to ask is: “How do we reduce the inefficiencies and errors in developing complex weapon systems, so that we can continue to fund programs and actually afford to buy them? And buy them in sufficient quantities for the future while not sacrificing the capability of our current forces?”

In previous years, the House Armed Services Committee enacted legislative provisions and reduced funding for FCS. These changes were designed to provide better oversight of the Army’s chief modernization program, and steer it back in the right direction. For example, the committee highlighted three years ago that the Army had traded-off too much survivability in order to fit one Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV) into one C-130 aircraft. Consequently, the Army has increased survivability of the vehicles, and the current requirement is to put three MGV’s on one larger C-17.

In addition, the Committee was concerned that FCS entered the systems development phase too early, proceeding with immature technologies and undefined requirements. We directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a “Go, No-Go” review of the FCS program following its Preliminary Design Review in 2009.  Although I believe that past legislative provisions and funding cuts helped the Army make difficult decisions earlier than they otherwise would have, I am now concerned that continued funding cuts to FCS may do more than just “steer” the program in the right direction.

Continued oversight in the form of additional legislative provisions will likely be necessary for the FCS program, but Congress must not slash funding for FCS in the 2009 defense budget. At some point Congress must give the Army the opportunity to procure and field this enhanced capability. And given that the Congressionally-mandated “Go, No-Go” decision is in 2009, it is imperative that we give the Army the opportunity to succeed by providing a year of stable funding.

The issue isn’t that Congress doesn’t understand the FCS story. In 1999 when then Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki, revealed his vision of transformation, I don’t remember him talking about creating and saving programs. He talked about relevancy. He talked about threats. And he talked about capability. The issue is that in pursuit to “save the FCS program at all cost story,” the Army has lost its message as to what our Army of the future will need to be successful.

I am often reminded by brave American warfighters (whom I have been honored to spend time with in theater) that battles are won and lost down in the mud, or the sand or in dark urban alleys, by warriors who are armed with the right equipment and are well-trained. This is the core of America’s military success story.

There are two messages to send prior to action on the 2009 defense authorization bill.  To Congress:  fully fund the FCS program in 2009.  To the Army:  get the story right, deliver as promised in 2008, and set the conditions to conduct a successful design review in 2009.

This entry was posted on Monday, April 28th, 2008 at 10:33 am and is filed under Politics, Homeland Security .