What do you do with a country like Pakistan? It is a nation that is led by a general who seized power in a military coup eight years ago and declared a state of emergency, that obtained nuclear weapons in defiance of non-proliferation regimes, that has sent missile and nuclear technology to some of America’s fiercest enemies, that has fought a long-running insurgency in Kashmir, and that is now home to a reconstituted and strengthening al Qaeda. It is also a vital U.S. ally and major recipient of U.S. aid in a region where we do not have many friends, one of the most strategically located countries in the world without whose help defeating the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan would be nearly impossible, and faces its own growing threat from Islamic extremists.

Dealing with all of these competing strategic interests is never going to be easy, especially for a U.S. administration not known for its diplomatic subtlety. Compromise to ensure stability would appear to be the best possible strategy to eliminate the chaos of the worst possible outcome. The fear of just what might happen if the lid were to come off has led to a policy of taking one step forward but always being forced to take two steps back. We stave off disaster in the short term, but the pressure continues to build and that worst possible outcome keeps getting worse.

Pakistan’s president, General Pervez Musharraf, who has served as both president and head of the army since he seized power in 1999 and badly wants to keep both jobs, has played the complexities and contradictions of contemporary Pakistan to maximum advantage. Musharraf’s trump card, however, is America’s fear of an Islamist takeover of his nuclear-armed country, creating the perverse situation in which the less effective he is, the more important he becomes. American reaction to this new crisis has been predictably tame, with Pakistan’s minister of information exposing how the U.S. will let Musharraf get away with just about anything as long as he keeps the Islamists at bay, “they would rather have a stable Pakistan — albeit with some restrictive norms — than have more democracy prone to fall in the hands of extremists.�

Pakistan has a problem with Islamic extremists, of that there can be no doubt. Yet what the Bush Administration should question is whether there is any real prospect of Islamists gaining control of the country if Musharraf allowed free and fair elections. Islamist parties had never won more than 5 percent of the vote in any election before 2002, when a coalition of four fundamentalist parties captured 11 percent and third place in Parliamentary voting. One factor in that total was certainly a reaction to Musharraf’s decision to support the United States, but far more decisive was his banning of most opposition parties coupled with greater freedom to campaign for the Islamists. Since that election, tribal leaders that support the Taliban solidified control of the western provinces bordering Afghanistan, Islamist parties gathered greater support, and extremists increased the level of violence throughout the country. Islamists are growing in power and influence as a direct result of Musharraf’s policies, but they are still not the dominating force in Pakistani politics.

An announcement from General Musharraf that Parliamentary elections scheduled for January 2008 will go ahead in mid-February provides the United States with an opening to put pressure on the regime. Musharraf’s last remaining pillar of support is a Pakistani military that has grown both richer and more irritated as a result of U.S. policy. The challenge facing the United States is to drive a wedge between Musharraf and other senior military leaders, convincing them that Musharraf’s reign is nearing the end and persuade them to steer him towards a soft landing. To do this, the United States should condition the continued flow of military aid on Musharraf abiding by his own word and holding those February elections in open and fair conditions. No elections, no more military aid. If the Musharraf government cannot keep its word on elections, how can we know it’s really using those billions to fight terrorists?

Far from ensuring that extremists do not gain power, Musharraf’s “second coup� may actually hasten that eventuality as the most severe impacts will be felt by the traditional democratic parties and the judiciary. If no Parliamentary elections are held and mainstream opposition groups are marginalized, the only remaining avenue for resistance to Musharraf will be the Islamists. Now is not the time to weaken democratic institutions in the face of a rising tide of Islamism, it is the time to strengthen them while the Islamists can still be defeated. It must be clear that choosing Musharraf is not choosing stability, as his faltering regime has become part of the problem. Backing Musharraf now will not even get the United States one step forward, only three steps back.

This entry was posted on Monday, November 12th, 2007 at 4:46 pm and is filed under Politics, Foreign Policy .